“Albania does not need just a rotation of power. It needs a change in the relationship between the citizen the party and the state… Edi Rama is a symptom of a system that has allowed the concentration of power. But if we want to cure the disease, it is not sufficient to change the symptom”
By ‘Flamingo Revolution’ Movement , @Flamingo_TV
Tirana, 09 November 2026, dtt-net.com / flamingorevolution.eu – Albania does not begin and end with a prime minister, nor do Albania’s problems today begin and end with Edi Rama. The problem lies in the political system which has concentrated power in party leaders, weakened citizen representation and created the conditions for the centralization of power.
Usually when Albanian politics is discussed, it is discussed as a problem of characters, to the point where we confuse the symptom with the disease.
Edi Rama has been at the helm of the government since 2013. He has political responsibility for the decisions of his government, for the way the administration functions and for the relationship between power and institutions. But Albania was not created with his coming to power, nor did the Albanian political system begin with him. The concentration of power, the control of parties over representation, the weakness of institutions and clientelistic relations are problems that have much older roots.
Therefore, the removal of a prime minister, no matter how politically important, is not equivalent to changing the system that produces him.
2008: WHEN THE PARTIES DECIDED TO CHANGE THE RULES
An important starting point is the 2008 political agreement.
On 21 April 2008, constitutional amendments adopted by consensus of the two major parties, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party, changed the electoral system. The mixed system with 100 direct mandates and 40 compensatory mandates was abandoned, moving to a regional proportional system. In December of the same year, the new Electoral Code was adopted.
The Council of Europe documented that the reform was the result of a broad consensus between the two main parties, while it was opposed by most smaller parties. The Venice Commission also raised concerns about the special treatment of party leaders, who could run in all electoral districts.
But the significance of 2008 does not lie only in the formula for distributing mandates. What also changed was the relationship between the citizen, the candidate, and the party.
Instead of political representation being built primarily through the competition of candidates with voters, candidate lists were placed under the control of party leadership structures. The chairman and the leadership circle gained a much greater role in determining who could become a deputy.
Thus, the MP risked no longer seeing the mandate as a responsibility to the voters, but as an opportunity that stemmed from the trust of the party leader.
This wasn’t just a technical electoral issue. It was a change in the architecture of political representation.
From citizens’ democracy to mayors’ democracy
In a functioning democracy, parties are instruments of political representation. They aggregate interests, produce alternatives, select candidates, and compete for the trust of citizens.
In Albania, parties have gradually acquired a different character: they have become centres of concentration of political decision-making and control over public careers.
The president determines the list, the lists determine the composition of parliament, parliament supports the government, and the government controls a significant portion of the country’s administrative and political resources.
This mechanism creates a chain of dependency. The MP depends on the party, the candidate on the mayor, the administrator on the political majority, and some public careers on the relationship with the government.
When this relationship becomes more important than institutions and rules, the party ceases to be just a participant in the state and begins to behave as if the state were its extension.
This is one way to understand the concept of the party-state: not necessarily the formal disappearance of institutions, but the weakening of their autonomy and the subordination of their functioning to the interests of the political majority.
Electoral Code: the citizen votes, the party decides
Subsequent changes did not solve this problem.
The 2020 reform, constitutional amendments, and subsequent interventions in the Electoral Code brought open lists, preferential voting, and changes in the way political competition is organized.
However, the system applied in the 2025 elections provided for two lists: a closed list with a predetermined ranking and a list for preferential voting. The closed list has priority in the distribution of mandates.
So, the voter can express a preference for a candidate, but this does not mean that his preference necessarily determines the representative who will hold the mandate.
The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s report on the Albanian elections expressly states that this two-list system significantly reduces the role of voters in the selection of candidates. The closed list maintains a strong mechanism of party control over the composition of parliament.
This is why it is not enough to talk about free voting. We must also talk about the real power of the vote to determine who represents the citizen.
Electoral autocracy: when elections continue, but competition is distorted
Democracy is not measured solely by whether elections are held every four years.
It is also measured by the opposition’s real ability to compete, the independence of institutions, the freedom of the media, parliamentary control over the executive, and the ability of citizens to politically punish the government.
In political science, the concept of electoral autocracy describes systems where elections continue to exist, opposition parties are allowed to compete, and democratic institutions are formally preserved, but the field of competition has been so distorted that elections no longer guarantee a level playing field.
An academic study published in the journal Democratization, titled Fading Freedoms: Democratic Decline in Albania, analyses Albanian developments during the period 2006–2022 and identifies trends of democratic regression, including the deterioration of electoral justice, the increase in vote buying, and restrictions on the media and civil society.
International observers have also documented concrete problems. The OSCE/ODIHR report on the 2025 elections found that, although the elections were competitive and professionally administered, the contestants did not have a level playing field. There were reports of the use of public resources and institutional power by the ruling party, pressure on public employees, intimidation, and cases of vote buying.
These are not simply election day flaws. They are problems that affect the very conditions in which political legitimacy is produced.
WHEN POLITICS, ECONOMY AND CRIME MEET
Another dimension of the crisis is the relationship between politics, money and organized crime.
It is not necessary to prove that every institution is captured by crime to understand the danger of this combination. It is enough to analyse the mechanisms through which illicit capital can seek political influence, through financing, investments, money laundering, public contracts and relationships with powerful individuals.
Organized crime does not necessarily need to take power. If it can secure protection, information, economic access, or impunity, it can benefit from power without being in government itself.
Europol has documented operations against Albanian networks involved in international cocaine trafficking and money laundering. The European Commission, in its reports on Albania, has called for strengthening financial investigations, the fight against money laundering and guaranteeing the independence of law enforcement agencies.
The term “narco-state” is increasingly used in Albanian public debate. The serious question is not how often we use the term, but whether institutions can investigate without hindrance the possible connections between illicit money, public decision-making, and political power.
This is where the importance of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption Structure (SPAK) and the justice institutions lies: not in their use as an argument in the conflict between parties, but in their ability to investigate anyone, regardless of political or economic position.
BEYOND THE FRAME
Edi Rama is responsible for the government he leads. But reducing the Albanian crisis to his figure leaves us with a risk: changing the person and preserving the mechanism.
If Rama leaves tomorrow, but the party leader continues to determine parliamentary representation; if the administration continues to be dependent on political power; if party financing remains opaque; if the media and control institutions do not gain real independence; if the economy continues to nurture clientelistic relationships and suspicious capital is not investigated, then the change will be mainly in name and face.
ALBANIA DOES NOT JUST NEED A ROTATION OF POWER. IT NEEDS A CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CITIZEN, THE PARTY AND THE STATE
This requires reforms that do not depend on the will of a president: electoral rules that give citizens real power in selecting representatives; internal party democracy; professional and depoliticized administration; transparency of political financing; a parliament that controls the executive; independent media; a judiciary that investigates without discrimination, and institutions that do not change function according to the colour of the government.
Because a democracy is not the property of the party that wins the election. The state is not the property of the government. And the party is not the property of the president.
Edi Rama is a symptom of a system that has allowed the concentration of power. But if we want to cure the disease, it is not enough to change the symptom.
WE MUST CHANGE THE SYSTEM THAT PRODUCES THIS DISEASE.
The ‘Flamingo Revolution’ is an ongoing, grassroots, and youth-led anti-government protest movement in Albania that erupted in May 2026.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of dtt-net.com.
