By Ana Pisonero
Brussels, 10 June 2026, dtt-net.com – The measures proposed in the “non-paper” of France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg on safeguards & transitional measures for new accession of candidate countries seems to me as new comers are asked to pay for old foe grievances.
-Extending safeguards clauses to economic security and resilience against foreign interference
Could make sense if EU countries are ready to name and shame third countries this would refer to (Russia seems clear, but there is no common position vis a vis China or even less so other more traditional Allies EU is also keen to reduce its tech sovereignty dependencies)
–On the suggested need to retain transitional measures to open labour markets, even extending the maximum possible timeframe
This (at least to me) depicts a very negative narrative, considering the real brain drain problem in the Western Balkans, not to talk of country having to deal with an imposed war like Ukraine.
Even more staggering, trying to link the impact on labour markets to the housing problem in Member states as if candidates – future Member states- would be to blame for the housing crisis in many EU countries.
-On the monitoring mechanism suggested
While (somewhat) understandable, this brings back to memory the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) mechanism for Bulgaria and Rumania on the Rule of Law, as in the underlying recognition these countries were not ready at the time of accession to fully meet the standards).
The wide common understanding until now was that this mechanism should not be repeated as only countries fully ready to join (capable of enforcing EU Acquis across) the EU should do so.
–On safeguards to protect EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and non-regression clauses
Are these safeguards not sufficiently ensured by the conditionality mechanism for EU budget and applicable to all EU Member states without distinction old/new Member states?
-On new Article 7 procedure by 4/5th majority
Is this not a way for new Member states to pay for old grievances?
Should this possibility not cover all 27 Member states?
Shouldn’t conditionality for EU funds be better subject to complying with Rule of Law report recommendations addressed to all Member states, which are already being extended to candidate countries?
-Schengen accession
-As far as I can remember, Schengen accession has never been automatic (sic Bulgaria, Romania). Joining European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) as precondition for accession makes sense as it reduces possibilities for opt-outs across the board.
-Voting rights temporary ban
As regards strengthening the EU’s decision making process & limiting voting rights during transition (in particular as regards decisions on some enlargement related decisions -presumably opening/closing chapters-, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) & Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), or as regards safeguards against the conduct of the principle of sincere & loyal cooperation), again is this not new comers paying for old foe grievances?
Big question here is for how long would these restrictions apply?
Is this not short-lived unless relatively long periods apply?
These proposals seem more about convincing internal audiences in current 27 member states.
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Ana Pisonero is EU Affairs journalist, with 20 years experience and former European Commission spokesperson responsible for Neighbourhood and Enlargement & international partnerships.
This opinion of her was published in her Linkedin account?
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of dtt-net.com.
